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The Arab world witnessed an influx of satellite channels during the 1990s and in 
the early years of the first decade of the new century. Many analysts in the Arab 
world applauded this influx as a potential tool for political change in the Arab 
countries. Two stations were at the heart of the new optimism: Al-Jazeera and Al 
Arabiya, the two most prominent 24-hour news channels in the region. Al-
Jazeera proved to be more controversial because in its early years of 
broadcasting it managed to break taboos in the Arab media by tackling issues of 
human rights and hosting Arab dissidents. Also, its coverage of international 
conflicts (primarily Afghanistan and Iraq) has marked it as a counter-hegemonic 
news outlet. For the first time, the flow of news went from South to North. Some 
scholars who study Arab satellite media, and Al-Jazeera specifically, have gone 
so far as to suggest that it has created a new Arab public sphere (Lynch, Miladi). 
However, the political developments in the Arab world, mainly the recent 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and what is now happening in Bahrain, Libya, 
and Yemen, have raised questions as to how credible these suggestions are. And 
are we going to claim the same powers for social media in the Arab world?  
This article takes the form of a personal reflection on how successful (or not) 
Arab satellite channels are proving to be as a tool for political change and reform 
in the Arab world. Are these channels editorially free from Arab governments’ 
political and economic interests? And could new media (notably social 
networking sites) achieve what satellite channels have been unable to over the 
last two decades?  
1996 saw the launch of Al-Jazeera, the first 24-hour news channel in the Arab 
world. However, it didn’t have much of an impact on the media scene in the 
region until 1998 and gained its controversial reputation through its coverage of 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (see Zayani; Miles; Allan and Zelizer; El-Nawawy 
and Iskandar). In the Arab world, it gained popularity with its compelling talk 
shows and open discussions of human rights and democracy (Alterman). But its 
dominance didn’t last long.  
In 2003, Al Walid Al Ibrahim, son-in-law of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia 
(1921-2005) established Al Arabiya, the second 24-hour news channel in the 
Arab world, just before the start of the Iraq war. Many scholars and analysts saw 
in this a direct response to the popularity that Al-Jazeera was achieving with the 
Arab audiences. Al Arabiya, however, didn’t achieve the level of popularity that 
Al-Jazeera enjoyed throughout its years of broadcasting (Shapiro). Al Arabiya 
and Al-Jazeera Arabic subsequently became rivals representing political and 
national interests and not just news competitors. Indeed, one of Wikileaks’ latest 
revelations states that Al-Jazeera changed its coverage to suit Qatari foreign 
policy. The US ambassador to Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, was reported as saying:  
The Qatari prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, had joked in an interview 
that Al-Jazeera had caused the Gulf State such headaches that it might be better 
to sell it. But the ambassador remarked: “Such statements must not be taken at 
face value.” He went on: “Al-Jazeera’s ability to influence public opinion 
throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it 
is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip to 
improve relations. For example, Al-Jazeera’s more favourable coverage of Saudi 
Arabia's royal family has facilitated Qatari–Saudi reconciliation over the past 
year.” (Booth).  
The unspoken political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Lebanese 
domestic disputes, over Iran, and over the Palestinian internal conflict was 
played out in the two channels. 
This brings us to my central question: can Arab satellite channels, and 
specifically Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya, be regarded as tools for democratic 
political change?  
In the recent revolution in Tunisia (spring 2011), satellite channels had to catch 
up with what social media were reporting: and Al-Jazeera more so than Al 
Arabiya because of previous encounters between Al-Jazeera and Zein Al Abidine 
bin Ali’s regime (Greenslade, The Guardian). Bin Ali controlled the country’s 
media and access to satellite media to suit his interests. Al-Jazeera was banned 
from Tunisia on several occasions and had their offices closed down. Bin Ali 
allowed private TV stations to operate but under indirect state control when it 
came to politics and what Ben Ali’s regime viewed as national and security 
interests.  
Should we therefore give social networking credit for facilitating the revolution in 
Tunisia? Yes, we should. We should give it credit for operating as a mobilising 
tool. The people were ready, the political moment came, and the people used it. 
Four out of ten Tunisians are connected to the Internet; almost 20 per cent of 
the Tunisian population are on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem). We are talking 
about a newly media-literate population who have access to the new technology 
and know how to use it. On this point, it is important to note that eight out of 
ten Facebook users in Tunisia are under the age of 30 (Mourtada and Salem). 
Public defiance and displays of popular anger were sustained by new media 
outlets (Miladi). Facebook pages have become sites of networking and spaces for 
exchanging and disseminating news about the protests (Miladi). Pages such as 
“The people of Tunisia are burning themselves, Mr President” had around 15,000 
members. “Wall-posts” specifying the date and place of upcoming protest 
became very familiar on social media websites. They even managed to survive 
government attempts to disable and block these sites. Tunisian and non-
Tunisians alike became involved in spreading the message through these sites 
and Arab transnationalism and support for the revolution came to a head. Many 
adjacent countries had Facebook pages showing support for the Tunisian 
revolution. And one of the most prominent of these pages was “Egyptians 
supporting the Tunisian revolution.” There can be little doubt, therefore, that the 
success of the Tunisian revolution encouraged the youth of Egypt (estimated at 
80 per cent of its Facebook users) to rise up and persist in their call for change 
and political reform.  
Little did Wael Ghonim and his friends on the “Kolinah Khaled Said” (“We are all 
Khaled Said”) Facebook page know where their call for demonstrations on the 25 
January 2011 would lead. In the wake of the Tunisian victory, the “We are all 
Khaled Said” page (Said was a young man who died under torture by Egyptian 
police) garnered 100,000 hits and most of these virtual supporters then took to 
the streets on 25 January which was where the Egyptian revolution started.    
Egyptians were the first Arab youth to have used the Internet as a political 
platform and tool to mobilise people for change. Egypt has the largest and most 
active blogosphere in the Arab world. The Egyptian bloggers were the first to 
reveal corruption and initiated calls for change as early as 2007 (Saleh). A few 
victories were achieved, such as the firing and sentencing of two police officers 
condemned for torturing Imad Al Kabeer in 2007 (BBC Arabic). However, these 
early Egyptian bloggers faced significant jail sentences and prosecution (BBC 
News). Several movements were orchestrated via Facebook, including the 6 April 
uprising of 2007, but at this time such resistance invariably ended in persecution 
and even more oppression. The 25 January revolution therefore took the regime 
by surprise. In response, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his 
entourage (who controlled the state media and privately owned TV stations such 
as Dream TV) started making declarations that “Egypt is not Tunisia,” but the 
youth of Egypt were determined to prove them wrong. Significantly, Mubarak’s 
first reaction was to block Twitter, then Facebook, as well as disrupting mobile 
phone text-messaging and Blackberry-messaging services. Then, on Thursday 
27 January, the regime attempted to shut down the Internet as a whole. Al-
Jazeera Arabic quickly picked up on the events in Egypt and began live coverage 
from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which resulted in Mubarak’s block of Al-Jazeera’s 
transmission in Egypt and the withdrawal of its operational licences. One joke 
exchanged with Tunisian activists on Facebook was that Egyptians, too, had 
“Ammar 404” (the nickname of the government censor in Tunisia). It was not 
long, however, before Arab activists from across the regions started exchanging 
codes and software that allowed Egyptians to access the Internet, despite the 
government blockades. Egyptian computer science students also worked on 
ways to access the Worldwide Web and overcome the government’s blockade 
(Shouier) and Google launched a special service to allow people in Egypt to send 
Twitter messages by dialling a phone number and leaving a voice message 
(Oreskovic, Reuters). Facebook group pages like Akher Khabar’s “Latest News” 
and Rased’s “RNN” were then used by the Egyptian diaspora to share all the 
information they could get from friends and family back home, bypassing more 
traditional modes of communication. This transnational support group was 
crucial in communicating their fellow citizens’ messages to the rest of the world; 
through them, news made its way onto Facebook and then through to the other 
Arab nations and beyond. My own personal observation of these pages during 
the period 25 January to 12 February revealed that the usage of social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter changed markedly, shifting from being 
merely social in nature to becoming rapidly and primarily political, not only 
among Arab users in the Arab world, as Mourtada and Salem argue, but also 
throughout the Arabian diaspora. 
In the case of Libya’s revolution, also, social media may be seen to be a 
mobilising tool in the hands of both Libyans at home and across the Libyan 
diaspora. Libya has around 4 per cent of its population on Facebook (Mourtada 
and Salem), and with Gaddafi’s regime cracking down on the Internet, the 
Libyan diaspora has often been the source of information for what is happening 
inside the country. Factual information, images, and videos were circulated via 
the February 17th website (in Arabic and in English) to appeal to Arab and 
international audiences for help. Facebook and Twitter were where the hash tag 
“#Feb17th” was created. Omar Amer, head of the UK’s Libyan youth movement 
based in Manchester, told Channel 4: “I can call Benghazi or Tripoli and obtain 
accurate information from the people on the ground, then report it straight onto 
Twitter” (Channel 4 News). Websites inspired by #Feb17th were spread online 
and Facebook pages dedicated to news about the Libyan uprisings quickly had 
thousands of supporters (Channel 4 News). Social media networks have thus 
created an international show of solidarity for the pro-democracy protestors in 
Libya, and Amer was able to report that they have received overwhelming 
support from all around the globe. I think that it must therefore be concluded 
that the role Arab satellite channels were playing a few years ago has now been 
transferred to social media websites which, in turn, have changed from being 
merely social/cultural to political platforms. Moreover, the nature of the medium 
has meant that the diasporas of the nations concerned have been instrumental 
to the success of the uprisings back home.  
However, it would be wrong to suggest that broadcast media have been totally 
redundant in the revolutionary process. Throughout the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions, Al-Jazeera became a disseminating tool for user-generated content. 
A call for Arab citizens to send their footage of unfolding events to the Al-Jazeera 
website for it to re-broadcast on its TV screens was a key factor in the 
dissemination of what was happening. The role Al-Jazeera played in supporting 
the Egyptian revolution especially (which caused some Arab analysts to give it 
the name “channel of revolutions”), was quickly followed by criticism for their 
lack of coverage of the pro-democracy protests in Bahrain. The killing of 
peaceful protestors in Bahrain did not get airtime the way that the killing of 
Egyptian pro-democracy protestors had. Tweets, Facebook posts and comments 
came pouring in, questioning the lack of coverage from Bahrain. Al Arabiya 
followed Al-Jazeera’s lead. Bahrain was put last on the running order of the 
coverage of the “Arab revolutions.” Newspaper articles across the Arab world 
were questioning the absence of “the opinion and other opinion” (Al-Jazeera’s 
Arabic motto) when it came to Bahrain (see Al Akhbar). Al Jazeera’s editor-in-
chief, Hassan El Shoubaki, told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar that they were 
not deliberately absent but had logistical problems with the coverage since Al-
Jazeera is banned in Bahrain (Hadad). However, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera 
was also banned in Egypt and Tunisia and that didn’t stop the channel from 
reporting or remodelling its screen to host and “rebroadcast” an activist-
generated content. 
This brings us back to the Wikileaks’ revelation mentioned earlier. Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage of the Bahraini protests is influenced by Qatari foreign policy and, in 
the case of Bahrain, is arguably abiding by Qatar’s commitment to Gulf 
Cooperation Council security treaties. (This is one of the occasions where Al 
Arabiya and Al-Jazeera appear to have shared the same editorial guidelines, 
influenced by Qatari and Saudi Arabian shared policy.)  
Nevertheless, the Bahraini protests continue to dominate the social networks 
sites and information has kept flowing from Bahrain and it will continue to do so 
because of these platforms. The same scenario is also unfolding in Syria, but this 
time Al-Jazeera Arabic is taking a cautious stance while Al Arabiya has given the 
protests full coverage. Once again, the politics are obvious: Qatar is a supporter 
of the Syrian regime, while Saudi Arabia has long been battling politically with 
Syria on issues related to Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran (this position might 
change with Syria seeking support on tackling its own domestic unrest from the 
Saudi regime).  
All this confirms that there are limits to what satellite channels in the Arab world 
can do to be part of a process for democratic political reform. The Arab media 
world is not free of the political and economic influence of its governments, its 
owners or the various political parties struggling for control. However, this is 
clearly not a phenomenon unique to the Arab world. Where, or when, has media 
reporting ever been totally “free”? 
So is this, then, the age of new media? Could the Internet be a free space for 
Arab citizens to express their opinion and fulfil their democratic aspirations in 
bringing about freedom of speech and political freedom generally? Is it able to 
form the new Arab public sphere? Recent events show that the potential is there. 
What happened in Tunisia and Egypt was effectively the seizure of power by the 
people as part of a collective will to overthrow dictators and autocratic regimes 
and to effect democratic change from within (i.e. not having it imposed by 
foreign powers). The political moment in Tunisia was right and the people 
receptive; the army refused to respond violently to the protests and members of 
bin Ali’s government rose up against him. The political and social scene in Egypt 
became receptive after the people felt empowered by events in Tunis. Will this 
transnational empowerment now spread to other Arab countries open to change 
notwithstanding the tribal and sectarian alliances that characterise their 
populations? Further, since new media have proven to be “dangerous tools” in 
the hands of the citizens of Tunisia and Egypt, will other Arab regimes clamp 
down on them or hijack them for their own interests as they did the satellite 
channels previously? Maybe, but new media technology is arguably ahead of the 
game and I am sure that those regimes stand to be taken by surprise by another 
wave of revolutions facilitated by a new online tool. So far, Arab leaders have 
been of one voice in blaming the media for the protests (uprisings) their 
countries are witnessing—from Tunisia to Syria via Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and 
Libya. As Khatib puts it: “It is as if the social, economic, and political problems 
the people are protesting against would disappear if only the media would stop 
talking about them.” Yet what is evident so far is that they won’t. The media, 
and social networks in particular, do not of themselves generate revolutions but 
they can facilitate them in ways that we are only just beginning to understand. 
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